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ScienceDirectComparative psychologists and cognitive developmentalists
often share methods and topics of research. Here we review
three domains in which there has been particularly fruitful
interaction between the fields and reflect on the theoretical
positions behind these interactions. Overall, we conclude that
there is much to be gained, as cognitive and behavioural
scientists, for drawing together work from human children and
non-human species.
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An increasingly popular strategy is for comparative psy-
chologists and cognitive developmentalists to collaborate
and exchange findings [1]. Cognitive development con-
tinues throughout the lifespan but it is the early years of
childhood that have most to share with comparative
psychology and will be the focus here. First, we review
some (and certainly not all) of the domains in which there
has been interesting interaction, followed by reflection on
the theoretical positions behind these interactions.
Theory of mind
Theory of mind (attributing mental states to oneself and
others) was first described by researchers working with
chimpanzees [2] and raised many questions concerning
how to assess theory of mind. This challenge was taken up
by cognitive developmentalists who devised the unex-
pected transfer false belief task [3]: participants are asked
where someone thinks an object is when they have not
seen it moved. Three-year-olds typically answer incor-
rectly: he will look for the object where it is, but 4-year-
olds are more likely to say he will look where he left it.
Attempts have been made by both cognitive develop-
mentalists [4] and comparative psychologists [5] to reduce
the task demands (especially verbal) to see if successCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2017, 16:138–141 could be identified earlier in humans or in non-human
species. Onishi and Baillargeon [6] used looking time
measures with infants, aged only 15 months, who dis-
criminated between situations where an actor held a true
or false belief. Subsequently, researchers have claimed
that even 6-month-olds are sensitive to others’ false
beliefs [7,8].
Originally cognitive development borrowed this topic
from comparative psychology. Now the wheel has come
full circle and, very recently, a looking-time study showed
that bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans correctly
anticipate how an individual will act based on a false
belief [9]. Krupenye et al. based their task on Southgate’s
[10] “seminal anticipatory looking false-belief study with
human infants” p111. The remarkable success of non-
human apes and very young human infants are forcing
researchers to think carefully about interpretation (e.g.
[11–13]). Furthermore, it will be interesting to see
whether this new observation of non-human species’
performance will dissuade those who have argued that
theory of mind is uniquely human from seeing implicit
success on the false belief task as gold-standard evidence
for theory of mind.
Tool use
A second domain with fruitful exchange between cogni-
tive development and comparative psychology is that of
tool use and innovation. In the trap tube task individuals
use a stick to push or rake a reward from a horizontal
transparent tube. If the reward is pushed or pulled over a
trap in the tube, it is lost. In the original study [14],
capuchin monkeys failed to retrieve the reward. Chim-
panzees perform better, even succeeding in a control trial
with the tube rotated making the trap non-functional (e.g.
[15]). Interestingly, rooks showed mixed performance in a
version where they pulled a string to move the reward:
while most birds seemed to learn a set of associative rules,
one bird solved the task, even when associative rules
would result in the wrong behaviour [16].
Meanwhile, cognitive development has focussed on social
aspects of tool use, recognising that the diversity of
human tool use must rely on transfer between generations
of individuals (cumulative culture, see e.g. [17]). How-
ever, researchers often overlooked individual tool-use
abilities. Indeed, the first study of human children’s
performance on the trap tube was concerned with adult
demonstrations not children’s independent problem solv-
ing [18]. Two- and three-year-olds rarely retrieved thewww.sciencedirect.com
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Horner and Whiten [19] found that 5- and 6-year-olds
could master the trap tube, but were unaffected by social
demonstrations.
In another task, a New Caledonian crow bent a piece of
wire into a hook to retrieve a reward from a tall vertical
tube [20]. Despite the finding being heralded as evi-
dence for innovation in corvids (see Bird and Emery [21]
for an extension to rooks), it was a decade before this
tool-innovation task was conducted with human chil-
dren. These studies produced the surprising finding that
3- and 4-year-olds failed to make a novel tool to obtain a
reward and it was not until around 8 years that the
majority of children succeeded [22]. Similar results
were observed in children from different cultures [23]
and tested in different environments (although when
tested in an informal museum setting, while 3- and 4-
year-olds struggled, success was seen earlier than 8 years
[24]). In a similar vein, Reindl et al. [25] tested children
on 12 tool-using behaviours based on those observed in
wild great apes and identified as potentially cultural e.g.
[26]. For example, a) chimpanzees use sticks to making
probing holes in termite nests; children were required to
use a stick perforate a barrier in a box to retrieve a
sticker, b) chimpanzees use sticks to fish for honey or
water; children were required to use a stick to dip for
paint in a tube. Two-year-olds were able to reinvent
these novel tool-use behaviours and at least some of
them successfully completed the task (e.g. (a) retrieved
the sticker, (b) transferred the paint to a new container).
One change made in adapting these behaviours for
children was that participants were directed by an adult
to try to solve a task (but not told how they should do
this), whereas the wild great apes were solving tasks that
they had identified.
Mental time travel
Research on what it is to think about the future and the
past (mental time travel) has generated much interaction
between cognitive development and comparative
psychology.
It often benefits an individual to reject a current reward
and wait for a better one. In the 1970s Mischel and
colleagues (reviewed in [27]) developed delay of gratifi-
cation tasks in which children had to choose between a
small reward delivered immediately or a larger reward
later. Preschoolers improve in their ability to wait for the
larger reward with age. This research question was
adopted by comparative researchers, often explicitly, e.
g. Beran [28] asks “whether chimpanzees can delay
gratification in a manner similar to that of human chil-
dren” p121. Chimpanzees [28,29] and orangutans [30]
delay on tasks that measure either delay choice (where
one chooses explicitly between 2 rewards with different
wait times) or delay maintenance (waiting for the largerwww.sciencedirect.com reward while one can accept at any point the small one).
Furthermore, a language-trained grey parrot, waited up to
15 min for a larger reward [31] and corvids will wait for
qualitatively (but not quantitively) different rewards [32].
Clayton and Dickinson [33] used an intriguing study to
argue that scrub jays could engage in episodic-like mem-
ory, recalling what happened, when, and where: scrub jays
cached a preferred food (worms) in location A at time
1 and a less preferred food (nuts) in location B at time 2 (or
vice versa). They were able to retrieve food at time 3, 4 h
after hiding food at time 2 and 124 h after time 1. Without
any further intervention, birds sought food preferentially
from the worm location. However, if the birds learnt that
worms became inedible after 124 h, they only sought
them if they were cached at time 2.
A neat analogue of this study [34] had children explore
two rooms each containing an identical set of four loca-
tions (bags and boxes), one of which held a toy. The
hidden toy was different in each room. At a later time,
children returned to one room (the clue to ‘when’ the
event happened) and were asked to find the toy. It was
not until five-years-old that children consistently per-
formed well.
Developmental research has highlighted another impor-
tant element of temporal thinking: the understanding that
the future is undetermined. In one study [35], children
saw a mouse about to come down an inverted Y-shaped
slide. Children were asked to place cotton wool to cushion
its landing. ‘Ideally’ children should ensure that there was
cotton wool under both possible exits (both branches of
the Y). Five- and six-year-olds did, however, three- and
four-year-olds tended to cover only one exit, suggesting
that they did not represent the future as holding multiple
possibilities.
Redshaw and Suddendorf [36] used the same basic para-
digm to test chimpanzees and orangutans. Like younger
children, the apes covered just one potential exit. They
also tested human children, finding earlier success than in
the original study, at 3- rather than 5- years, probably
because the target response was simpler for children:
putting out their hands, rather than moving cotton wool
mats. Thus, here is an example of a methodological
change directed at testing non-humans, which also
reveals new evidence about human children (note how-
ever, that the newer study does not contain control trials
included in the original study [35]).
Interaction
As these three domains illustrate there is very fruitful
interaction between comparative psychology and cogni-
tive developmentalists in sharing and improving meth-
odologies. Although there are some tasks where very
similar methods can be used cross species, it remainsCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2017, 16:138–141
140 Comparative cognitionthe case that there will always be some differences in how
we test human children and non-human species (and
probably between different populations of non-human
species as well). For example, when a nonverbal task has
been run with non-human animals and is adapted for
human children it is tempting to maintain the lack of any
verbal instructions or communication. However, this can
risk putting additional social demands on the child, who
will expect some interaction from the adult experimenter.
Instead, developmental researchers often minimise ver-
bal instructions or adult interaction (e.g. [22]), but they
cannot do this entirely, nor need they, for fruitful
exchange between the fields.
When observing these interactions, it is also important to
recognise the differing theoretical approaches used by
researchers between (and sometimes within) fields. Com-
parative psychologists often seek ‘existence proofs’, i.e.
whether a species has the capacity to think in a certain
way. For psychologists studying humans the existence
proof is typically already established: we know that
human adults can think about minds, use tools, and
mental time travel. Some researchers explore whether
elements of these abilities exist innately, see [37], which
is to some extent a developmental existence proof. But
most of the studies we covered in this review are con-
cerned with older children. The researchers conducting
these studies tend ask questions about patterns in devel-
opment, for example, which abilities are necessary to
support others’ emergence or the processes by which
change occurs e.g. [38]. One important difference, which
becomes obvious as one engages with the two fields, is
that in the search for existence proofs evidence from a
successful individual is sufficient. Whereas for develop-
mental psychologists interested in patterns of change a
single success is more likely to be treated as an outlier.
Both approaches are valid, but we need to avoid ambigu-
ities when the fields come together to talk about whether
a particular participant group ‘can’ think in a particular
way.
Other researchers who focus on the question of human
uniqueness e.g. [39,40] (or other species’ uniqueness), are
also interested in the comparisons between human chil-
dren and non-human species. Studies of young children
are beneficial for these comparisons, because tasks need
to be simplified as much as possible, if one is to claim that
a particular species does not show a way of thinking. A
related approach, but with a complementary goal, is the
search for evidence of our evolutionary history. Here the
search is for correspondence between human children
and non-human species which can be interpreted as
evidence that the ability was present in our shared
ancestry.
In conclusion, there are many examples of transfer of
concepts and methodologies between comparativeCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2017, 16:138–141 psychologists and cognitive developmentalists. Theory
of mind, tool use, and mental time travel are three
particularly interactive domains although there are many
others. Interaction can generate new ideas for research
studies, which benefits researchers primarily interested in
human children or non-human species. It also allows for
comparison between species which contributes to ques-
tions of species uniqueness and evolution. In sum, the
fields have much to offer and gain from each other.
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